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Abstract: In this paper, we assess the impact of the securities transaction tax (STT) introduced in France in 2012 
on market liquidity and volatility. To identify causality, we rely on the unique design of this tax that is imposed 
only on large French firms, all listed on Euronext. This provides two reliable control groups (smaller French 
firms and foreign firms also listed on Euronext) and allows using difference-in-difference methodology to isolate 
the impact of the tax from other economic changes occurring simultaneously. We find that the STT has reduced 
trading volume, but we find no effect on theoretically based measures of liquidity, such as price impact, and no 
significant effect on volatility. The results are robust if we rely on different control groups (German stocks), 
analyze dynamic effects or construct a control group by propensity score matching. 
Keywords: Financial transaction tax, Securities transaction tax, Tobin tax, Volatility, Liquidity, Euronext. 
JEL Classification: G21, H25. 
 
L'impact de la taxation des transactions financières sur la liquidité et la volatilité des actions françaises 
Résumé : Dans cet article, nous évaluons l’impact de la taxe sur les transactions financières (TTF), introduite en 
France en 2012, sur la liquidité et la volatilité des actions. Cette taxe se prête particulièrement bien à une étude 
d’impact dans la mesure où seules les grandes entreprises qui ont leur siège social en France sont taxées, 
permettant ainsi d’identifier deux groupes de contrôle : les autres entreprises françaises et les entreprises 
étrangères, toutes cotées sur Euronext. Nous utilisons la méthode des doubles-différences pour isoler l’impact de 
la taxe d’autres changements économiques survenus simultanément. Il en ressort que la TTF a réduit les volumes 
de transaction, mais sans que cela n’ait d’effet sur la liquidité. Nous ne décelons, en outre, aucun effet sur la 
volatilité. Ces résultats sont robustes même en utilisant d’autres groupes de contrôle (les actions allemandes) ou 
en appliquant une méthode d’appariement sur les scores de propension. 
Mots-clés : Taxe sur les transactions financières, Taxe Tobin, Volatilité, Liquidité, Euronext. 
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 “And then there’s the proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax... Even 
to be considering this at a time when we are struggling to get our 
economies growing is quite simply madness”. 
David Cameron, British Prime Minister 
 
“And then there’s the idea of taxing financial transactions, which have 
exploded in recent decades. The economic value of all this trading is 
dubious at best. In fact, there’s considerable evidence suggesting that too 
much trading is going on… it suggests that to the extent that taxing 
financial transactions reduces the volume of wheeling and dealing, that 
would be a good thing.” 
Paul Krugman, economist and Nobel Laureate 
 
 
1. Introduction: A ‘madness’ or a ‘good thing’? 
Will a tax on financial transactions curb speculative activity and render financial markets 
more stable? Or will it hurt market liquidity and price discovery, thus, making markets even 
more volatile? Although the idea to tax financial transactions dates to Keynes (1936) and 
Tobin (1978), it has received a renewed attention of policy leaders as a result of the global 
financial crisis. The idea appears to be particularly popular in Europe. In June 2011, the 
European Commission proposed to set up a financial transaction tax (FTT) as a source of the 
EU budget, but there was no unanimous support within the EU member states for a common 
FTT. Hence, in September 2012 eleven EU states chose to introduce a FTT, which was 
initially planned to come in force in 2014.1 This will be the first time that the FTT is 
introduced in a group of countries, but different versions of FTT exist in almost thirty 
countries in the world, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Hong-Kong, China, and 
Brazil. In some countries stocks and derivatives are taxed, like in the EU project, but most of 
the financial transaction taxes are levied only on stocks – and are referred as to securities 
transaction taxes (STT). 
The debate on FTT is among the most visible and newsworthy aspects of financial regulation 
and one of the most controversial topics.2 According to a survey conducted by the European 
                                                 
1
 Gabor (2013) provides an in-depth analysis of the political economics of the European Commission’s proposal.  
2
 To give a broad idea, the entry “Tobin tax” is listed in the top 250 controversial issues among Wikipedia 
editors for the category “Politics/Economics”, along with such entries as Capital punishment, Holocaust, Gun 
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Commission, FTT is supported by six out ten Europeans. The strength of the support varies 
considerably among the countries: in France, Germany or Italy seven out of ten respondents 
are in favor of the FTT, while there are only four in Sweden or the UK and only three in the 
Netherlands.3 At the same time, European political leaders are strongly divided on the merits 
of FTT and the opposition is expressed in harsh terms. For the Swedish Finance Minister, 
Anders Borg, such tax is “very dangerous”, its Dutch counterpart, Jan Kees de Jager fears 
“devastating results”, UK Prime Minister, David Cameron considers FTT as a “madness”.4 
Several leading economists have also expressed strong views on this topic. For some 
(including Kenneth Rogoff5), FTT is not only inefficient, but counterproductive, while for 
others (among which Paul Krugman6, Avinash Persaud7, Jeffrey Sachs8), it might be a win-
win initiative.  
Despite the popularity of FTT and the surrounding controversies, the academic literature is 
rather scarce.9 Theoretically, FTT should decrease trading volume due to an increase in 
transaction costs, but the ultimate impact on volatility depends on what type of traders is 
driven from the market. In the framework of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, agents are 
supposed to be perfectly rational and stock prices reflect fundamentals. Increasing liquidity 
and speculation are stabilising factors. Accordingly, the increase in transaction costs due to 
the FTT will reduce liquidity by driving away rational agents, thus, automatically amplifying 
market volatility (Schwert and Seguin, 1993; Dooley, 1996; Kupiec, 1996; Subrahmanyam, 
1998; Amihud and Mendelson, 2003). Alternatively, if noise traders (either uniformed or not 
perfectly rational) prevent stock prices from converging to their fundamental value, increasing 
trading is destabilising. By discouraging noise traders’ activity, the FTT will dampen market 
volatility (Stiglitz, 1989; Summers and Summers, 1989; Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz, 
1995). 
Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2009) provide an elegant framework which encompassed the 
two previous paradigms. They use a laboratory market to investigate the behavior of noise 
traders and their impact on the market. While FTT do “reduce volume, [it] do[es] not affect 
                                                                                                                                                        
politics, Same-sex marriage, etc. If we restrict the list to economic issues, it appears in the top 10 together with 
some broad matters like Capitalism or Communism. 
3
 EU 27 (In favor: 61%; Opposed: 25%), France (71%; 19%), Germany (74%; 16%), Italy (72%; 14%), Sweden 
(45%; 46%), UK (43%; 41%), Netherlands (36%; 53%). Source: Standard Eurobarometer n°74, January 2011. 
4
 Quotes are from The New York Times, Oct. 9, 2012 and The Telegraph, Jan. 26, 2012. 
5
 Kenneth Rogoff, The wrong tax for Europe, Project Syndicate, Oct. 3, 2011. 
6
 Paul Krugman, Things to tax, The New York Times, Nov. 27, 2011. 
7
 Avinash Persaud, EU’s financial transaction tax is feasible, and if set right, desirable, VoxEu, Sept. 30, 2011. 
8
 Jeffrey Sachs, Obama, the G20, and the 99 Percent, Huffington Post, Nov. 1, 2011. 
9
 A comprehensive literature survey is provided in Matheson (2011) or McCulloch and Pacillo (2011). 
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spreads and price impact measures, and have at most a weak effect on the informational 
efficiency of prices.” They explained this result by arguing that the FTT has driven away both 
rational and noise traders. Song and Zhang (2005) come to a similar conclusion in a general 
equilibrium setting.  
Hau (1998) also develops a model in which endogenous entry of traders may increase the 
capacity of the market to absorb exogenous supply risk, but at the same time it adds noise and 
endogenous trading risk. The competitive entry equilibrium is characterized by excessive 
market entry and excessively volatile prices. A positive tax on entrants can decrease trader 
participation and volatility while increasing market efficiency. Finally, there might be a U-
shaped relationship between liquidity and excessive volatility (Haberer, 2004; Ehrenstein et 
al., 2005). At low levels of market volume, greater liquidity reduces excess volatility. 
However, after a certain point, the confusion caused by speculation creates a positive 
relationship between liquidity and excess volatility.  
Since theoretical predictions are ambiguous, it is important to examine the impact of the FTT 
empirically. In this paper, we study the introduction, in 2012, of a 0.2 percent tax on daily 
acquisitions of French equity securities. We are interested in calculating the impact of this 
STT on market quality measured by market liquidity and volatility. Our contribution to the 
existing literature is twofold. First, we believe that our study provides a rigorous investigation 
of causality between STT and market quality. This is possible due to the unique design of the 
French STT. As the tax is levied only on large French firms – all of them listed on Euronext – 
this provides two control groups: smaller French firms and foreign firms also listed on 
Euronext. Hence, we can rely on difference-in-difference methodology to isolate the impact 
of the tax from other economic or regulatory developments during the analyzed period. 
Although some earlier studies follow this approach, their control groups are not fully 
convincing because stocks are traded in a completely different institutional environment, such 
as foreign or over-the-counter market (Umlauf, 1993; Pomeranets and Weaver, 2012). It is 
important to note that the French STT is virtually the only tax in the world that has affected 
differently large and small firms.10 
Our second contribution consists in a rigorous analysis of different dimensions of market 
liquidity and volatility. Usual measures of liquidity in the academic literature can be classified 
in three main categories: volume-based measures (volume and turnover ratio), transaction cost 
                                                 
10
 In March 2013, Italy has introduced a similar STT which does not apply to companies whose average market 
capitalization is lower than €500 million.  
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measures (bid-ask spread), and price-impact measures (liquidity ratio and price reversal). 
These measures gauge different aspects of market liquidity and are often complements and 
not substitutes (Vayanos and Wang, 2012). Similarly, we plan to investigate the impact on 
market volatility measured by several alternative measures, such as absolute and squared 
close-to-close returns, daily conditional variance, and price range.  
Our study shows that the introduction of the French STT has reduced market volume, but 
there is no effect on theoretically based measure of liquidity, such as price impact. As to 
volatility measures, the results are statistically insignificant. The results are robust if we rely 
on different control groups (German stocks included in DAX and MDAX), analyze dynamic 
effects or construct a control group by propensity score matching. Overall, our results give 
support to the laboratory observations made by Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2009). For 
policy purposes, we can conclude that the French STT cannot be used as a Pigouvian tax to 
decrease market volatility, but it does not lead to harmful distortions either. 
Recently, several unpublished studies have independently examined the impact of the French 
STT (Becchetti, Ferrari and Trenta, 2013; Colliard and Hoffman, 2013; Haferkorn and 
Zimmermann, 2013; Meyer, Wagener, and Weinhardt, 2013). All these studies rely on a 
difference-in-difference methodology, but they only examined short-term effects (over a 
maximum period of a few months after the introduction of the tax). They are mainly 
interested in the impact on liquidity, and do not provide much evidence on volatility. Overall, 
they support our results.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data, the empirical strategy and the construction 
of the liquidity and volatility measures. Section 4 reports our empirical results. Section 5 
provides several robustness tests: different samples (smaller but more homogeneous), and 
different method (propensity score matching). Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Overview of the empirical literature 
Since theoretical predictions are ambiguous, a number of papers empirically examine the 
impact of the STT on financial market11 (see Table 1 for a summary).12 When measuring the 
impact on liquidity (often proxied by volume), studies arrive at similar results as four out of 
                                                 
11
 Empirical evidence form the housing market in Singapore is recently provided by Fu, Qian and Yeung (2013).  
12
 A parallel body of literature examines the impact of the tick size on stock market quality. See Hau (2006) for a 
panel data study on the French market.  
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five studies in Table 1 find negative impact on liquidity and one study finds statistically 
insignificant result. As to volatility, results are inconclusive. Six out of eleven studies find 
inconclusive or statistically insignificant results; four studies find an increase in volatility for 
some subsamples, and one study finds a decrease in volatility. However, most of these studies 
suffer from methodological shortcomings because they do not address endogeneity problems.  
One potential source of endogeneity relates to reverse causality. Since transaction taxes are 
often perceived as a tool to reduce market volatility, it is likely that they are introduced in 
countries and during periods exhibiting high market volatility. Another source of endogeneity 
is due to simultaneity and omitted variable biases. In other words, we do not know how the 
same market would have behaved if the tax had not been introduced, as these studies do not 
allow us to isolate the impact of the STT from other economic developments or regulatory 
changes during the same time period. The three studies that suggest an increase of the stock 
market volatility (Baltagi, Li and Li, 2006; Phylaktis and Aristidou, 2007; Liau, 2012) do not 
control for simultaneity and omitted variable biases and, therefore, should be considered with 
caution. 
Several studies attempt to overcome the above endogeneity problems by relying on 
difference-in-difference methodologies. In order to isolate the effect of the tax from other 
effects that could influence volatility, these studies compare the differential impact of STT 
changes on treatment and control groups. Different types of control groups have been 
considered: American Depository Receipts, foreign stocks, over-the-counter and forward 
markets. 
Umlauf (1993) studies the introduction of the 1% securities transaction tax in Sweden in 1984 
and its increase to 2% in 1986. To analyze the impact on volatility, he relies on the control 
group that consists of the New York Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange indexes. 
Umlauf (1993) mentions that the Swedish tax was introduced for political reasons and, hence, 
the reaction of Swedish stock market could reflect increased political uncertainty that goes 
beyond the introduction of the tax. In this context, a control group from a different country 
does not allow isolating the effect of the tax from other economic and political developments 
in Sweden.  
Saporta and Kan (1997) analyze changes in the UK stamp duty during 1955-1996 by 
comparing shares of UK listed companies that are subject to the tax with the corresponding 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Although such approach is attractive, it only allows 
analyzing the impact on market volumes, because stocks and ADRs prices are closely related 
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due to arbitrage. Moreover, the reliability of their results suffers from small size of their 
control group that consists of only four ADRs. Liu (2007) relies on a similar methodology to 
analyze STT change in 1989 in Japan. His control group consists of 22 Japanese ADRs and he 
finds a negative impact on volumes. 
Pomeranets and Weaver (2012) analyze nine changes in the New York state STT between 
1932 and 1981 that affected stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange. They find that 
the STT has a negative impact on traded volumes, but no statistically significant impact on 
market volatility. Moreover, they find no consistent evidence that traders avoid the tax by 
changing their location of trades. Unfortunately, these results are difficult to generalize 
because the STT in New York was abolished in 1981 and since then, the increase in traded 
volume has been tremendous. In terms of methodology, for tax changes from 1975, they 
compare stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (treatment group) to stocks traded 
on the Nasdaq (control group). This approach was used earlier by Jones and Seguin (1997) 
who studied the 1975 introduction of lower, negotiated commissions on U.S. national stock 
exchanges that are analogous to a STT. The choice of such control group suffers from the fact 
that the decision to be listed or not on the organized exchange is likely to be endogenous, 
because reporting and regulatory requirements are smaller for stocks that are only traded on 
the Nasdaq. Moreover, the difference-in-difference analysis is performed only for volatility, 
but not for liquidity. 
Lastly, Foucault, Sraer and Thesmar (2011) analyze a reform of the French stock market that 
suppresses the possibility to trade with end-of-month settlement (the “Règlement Mensuel”, 
similar to a forward market) for highly liquid stocks and, thus, raises the relative cost of 
speculative trading for retail investors, who are often regarded as noise traders. This reform 
could be compared to the introduction of a STT. The authors rely on difference-in-difference 
methodology (with spot market as a control group) and show that the reform has significantly 
reduced the volatility of stocks. 
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Table 1. Previous studies on the impact of an increase1 in STT (or akin transaction costs)  
Studies Sample Type of 
reform 
Control group Measure of 
liquidity 
Results for 
liquidity1 
Measure of 
volatility 
Results for 
volatility1 
Roll (1989) 23 countries  
(1987-89) 
STT Countries  
without STT 
  Std .dev. of returns Not significant 
Umlauf (1993) Sweden  
(1984-86) 
STT None or  
NYSE-FTSE 
  Variance of returns Inconclusive 
Jones & Seguin (1997) U.S. 
(1974-1976) 
Fixed 
commissions 
Nasdaq   Std .dev. of returns, 
absolute returns 
Positive impact 
Saporta & Kan (1997) G.B.  
(1963-86) 
STT ADRs   Variance of returns, 
GARCH 
Not significant 
Hu (1998) H.-K., Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan 
(1977-93) 
STT None Turnover Inconclusive Std .dev. of returns Inconclusive 
Baltagi et al. (2006) China  
(1997) 
STT None Volume Negative 
impact 
Variance of returns, 
GARCH 
Positive impact 
Chou & Wang (2006) Taiwan 
(1999-2001) 
STT None Volume, bid-ask Negative 
impact 
Realized volatility, 
high-low range 
Not significant 
Liu (2007) Japan  
(1989) 
STT ADRs Volume, 
Autocorrelation 
Negative 
impact 
  
Phylaktis & Aristidou 
(2007) 
Greece 
(1998-00) 
STT None   GARCH Positive impact 
for highly traded 
stocks 
Foucault et al. (2011) France  
(1998 2002) 
Cost of 
forward 
trading  
Spot market Autocovariance, 
Amihud 
illiquidity 
Negative 
impact 
Std .dev. of returns, 
 
Negative impact 
Pomeranets & Weaver 
(2012) 
U.S.  
(1932-81) 
STT None or Nasdaq Holden spread, 
Amihud 
illiquidity 
Negative 
impact 
Std .dev. of returns Not significant 
Liau et al. (2012) Taiwan (1998-07) STT None   GARCH Positive impact 
1
 Although reviewed studies analyze increases or decreases in transaction costs, the reported results must be interpreted as a reaction to an increase in STT. 
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3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. The French securities transaction tax  
In January 2012, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the introduction a 0.1 
percent tax on financial transactions related to French stocks.13 The terms of the tax have been 
detailed in the Article 5 of the Supplementary Budget Act for 2012 (Act No. 2012-354 of 14 
March 2012), published in the Official Gazette (Journal Officiel) on 15 March 2012 and 
completed with the fiscal instruction 3°P-3-12 (BOI n°61 of 3 August 2012).14 The tax has 
three components: i) a tax on acquisitions of French equity securities and similar instruments 
(Article 235 ter ZD); ii) a tax on orders cancelled in the context of high frequency trading 
(Article 235 ter ZD bis); iii) a tax on naked sovereign credit default swaps (Article 235 ter ZD 
ter). After the election of François Hollande and shortly before its introduction, the rate of the 
tax on acquisitions of equity securities was doubled to 0.2 percent. The tax came into force on 
August 1, 2012.  
According to the initial estimate of the government, the tax should have yielded €1.6 billion in 
2013, that is around 0.2% of total fiscal revenues. One year later, based on the first result for 
2012, the estimate was adjusted downwards by fifty percent. In fact, the total revenue for 
2012 (August-December) was equal to €0.2 billion: 99.5% from acquisitions of equity 
securities and 0.5% from transactions on naked sovereign CDS. The tax on high-frequency 
trading generated no revenue (Finance committee of the French parliament’s lower house, 
Information report n°1328 of 25 July 2013), as will be discussed later. 
Hence, the main component of the taxing scheme is the tax on acquisitions of equity securities 
and similar instruments, defined as shares and other securities that provide or could provide 
access to capital or voting rights (hereafter, the STT). The tax does not apply to units in 
collective investment schemes and financial contracts (including options, futures and 
warrants). Exemptions also include: i) issuance of equity securities on the primary market, ii) 
transactions by a clearing house or a central depository, iii) activities related to market making 
(either for providing liquidity on a regular and continuous basis, or in response to orders 
initiated by clients, or by hedging positions arising from the fulfilment of the previous tasks), 
                                                 
13
 It should be noted that a STT already existed in France: it was called “Impôt sur les opérations de bourse”, 
created in 1893 and abrogated in 2007 (see Figure A in appendix). 
14
 Detailed of the French FTT are available on the website of the French Ministry of Economy: 
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/File/376507. 
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iv) acquisitions in the context of liquidity agreements, v) intra-group and restructuring 
transactions, vi) temporary transfers of securities, vii) employee saving scheme transactions, 
viii) exchange or conversion of bonds into shares. To prevent tax avoidance, the tax is due 
regardless of the place of establishment of the regulated market on which the security is 
traded, regardless of the place of establishment or residence of the parties to the transaction, 
and regardless of the place where the contract was entered into. 
Importantly for our identification strategy, the STT must be paid on the acquisition of stocks 
issued by companies whose headquarters are located in France and with market values of 
more than 1 billion Euros on January 1st of the year of taxation. The list of the stocks subject 
to this tax was published on 2th of July 2012 and it is composed of 109 stocks listed on 
Euronext. Hence, the design of the tax allows the split of the sample into a treatment and a 
control group with an ad-hoc cutoff of €1 billion.   
Among the 109 stocks subject to the French STT, 59 are included in the Euronext 100 index 
and 30 – in the Next 150. The remaining 20 stocks are not included in those indexes because 
their free float is too low (e.g. CIC or Autoroute Paris-Rhin-Rhone, with a free float lower 
than 3%) or because the company is controlled by a block of shareholders (e.g. Areva is held 
at 83% by the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique and the French Government, Euler Hermes 
is held at 67% by the founding family and at 18% by LVMH) – see Table A in appendix.  
Finally, the STT is collected once a day and, hence, intraday trading is not affected. To tax 
high-frequency trading, an additional tax of 0.01 percent was introduced on the amount of 
cancelled or modified orders, in excess of a threshold of 80%, within a time-span of half a 
second (Article 235 ter ZD bis and decree n°2012-957, August 6, 2012). As it was mentioned 
earlier, this tax on high-frequency trading had generated zero revenue in 2012. According to 
the French financial markets regulator (Autorité des Marchés Financiers), the market share of 
high-frequency trading in 2012 has remained virtually stable (slightly declined from 20% to 
18%) and so, there is strong evidence that the tax on high-frequency trading has been 
bypassed.15 In this context, this study focuses on daily measures of market quality. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Subsequently, in October 2013, the Finance committee of the French parliament’s lower house proposed to 
extent the STT to intraday trading. However, the French government was not in favor of this amendment which 
was finally rejected. 
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3.2. The sample  
Our initial sample consists of all the stocks included in the Euronext 100 or the Next 150 
indexes. Our period extends over 12 months: 6 months before the introduction of the STT 
(February 2012-July 2012) and 6 months after the introduction of the STT (August 2012-
January 2013).16 Data are daily. Thus, our panel is composed of a maximum of 254 days * 
250 firms = 63,500 observations. All the data are extracted from Datastream. For each stock, 
we have the opening and closing (adjusted) prices, the volume, the number of shares, the bid-
ask spread quoted at the close of the market, the highest and the lowest prices achieved on the 
day.  
We exclude from the initial sample six companies that have experienced a takeover bid in 
2012, plus a company for which information on trading volume is missing. This leaves 61,722 
observations, i.e. 97% of the initial sample. Firms subject to the French STT represent about 
one third of the sample. Further, for robustness checks, we exclude companies for which stock 
price was lower than €2 at least one day over the period or the total volume over the period 
below k€60,000. This robustness sample contains 82% of the initial one – see Table B in 
appendix. 
 
3.3. A difference-in-difference approach 
To identify the impact of the STT, we rely on the generalized version of the difference-in-
difference (DiD) methodology, and, hence we estimate the following econometric model: 
 =  + 	 + 
	 +  + ,       (1) 
where  is a measure of market liquidity or volatility for the firm i at time t, 	 is a firm 
dummy variable, 	 is a time dummy variable,  is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
for large French firms (market values of more than €1 billion) after the introduction of the 
STT on 1 August 2012 and  is an error term. Our coefficient of interest is . We estimate 
the equation allowing firm-level clustering of the errors that is allowing for correlation of the 
error term over time within firms (Bertrand et al., 2004).  
The design of the French STT is well suited for DiD methodology because French authorities 
have introduced a tax on only large French firms traded on Euronext and, hence, providing us 
                                                 
16
 We considered also a period of 1 year before the introduction of the STT to test the robustness. Results are 
available on request.  
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with two valid control groups: small French firms and foreign firms traded on Euronext. Time 
dummy variables capture all other changes in regulatory and economic environment during 
the period that should have affected large and small banks in a similar manner. Firm dummy 
variables capture differences between firms that are constant over time. In this way, the DiD 
methodology allows for differences in market behavior between large and small firms before 
the introduction of the STT, but its underlying assumption is that these differences would 
remain constant if the STT had not been introduced (the “parallel trends” assumption).  
We estimate equation (1) for three different subsamples based on two treatment groups and 
three control groups. In the first subsample, we consider all the firms that are included in the 
Euronext 100 index. All the French firms (59 firms, Panel A) in this subsample are subject to 
the tax, and our control group consists of foreign firms that are not subject to the STT (40 
firms, Panel B17). These foreign firms have headquarters in Belgium (11), Great Britain (1), 
Luxembourg (2), Netherlands (21), Portugal (4) or Spain (1). Second, we consider all French 
firms included in the Next 150 (78 firms). In this case, our treatment group is composed of 
large midcap French firms with a market value above 1 billion and that are subject to the STT 
(29 firms, Panel C18), while our control group consists of small mid-cap French firms with 
market value of less than 1 billion and that are not subject to the STT (49 firms, Panel D). 
Finally, we consider firms included in the Next 150 with the exception of small midcap 
French firms. Hence, our treatment group is, as before, the large French midcaps (29 firms, 
Panel C) and our control group consists of foreign firms included in Next 150 (66 firms, Panel 
E19). 
The main advantage of our study is that stocks included both in the treatment and the control 
groups are traded on the same stock exchange and, hence, with the same organizational, 
regulatory and competitive environment, and hence are usually subject to the same shocks. 
Nevertheless, both control groups used in this study (the foreign firms and the small midcaps) 
have their advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of the smaller French stocks is that 
they allow a better control for country-specific shocks, because they belong to the same 
country as treatment group. The advantage of foreign firms traded on Euronext is that their 
size is more comparable with the treatment group. One can question, however, whether this 
                                                 
17
 TNT Express, which experienced a takeover bid in 2012, has been removed from the initial sample. 
18
 CFAO, which experienced a takeover bid in 2012, has been removed from the initial sample. 
19
 Degven, Dockwise, Mediq, and LBI International which experienced a takeover bid in 2012, have been 
removed from the initial sample. Espirito Santo Finl GP has been also removed due to infrequent trading. 
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control group allows isolating the effect of the STT from other shocks that could have 
affected France during the same time period.  
One may argue that the STT might have a global impact on all Euronext stocks due to co-
movement in liquidity. Cespa and Foucault (2011) have shown that liquidity spillover can be 
positive or negative depending on the cost of price information. In either case, our estimate of 
the impact could be biased if we consider securities from Euronext as a control group. 
Therefore, we use also a control group consisting of German stocks traded on Deutsche 
Boerse (Xetra) and included in the DAX 30 or the MDAX 50 indexes. This sample is less 
likely to be impacted by potential co-movement in liquidity. 
The choice of the control groups is intended to be theoretically grounded. To confirm their 
relevance, we report in Table 2 the correlation of daily portfolio returns between treatment 
and control groups and compare it with previous studies that relied on control groups 
(Umlauf, 1993; Pomeranets & Weaver, 2012). Because we do not have access to data samples 
of earlier papers, we consider, as a proxy, the main stock indexes in Sweden, the US and the 
UK. To insure comparability, we first do the same for French, Belgium, Dutch and German 
stocks. Then we measure the correlation for our exact samples. 
Looking at our sample, we find that the correlation of returns between the French, the 
Belgium and the Dutch stock indexes is high. Precisely, for the largest firms (Euronext 100) 
correlation of daily returns between Panel A (FR, STT) and Panel B (noFR, no STT) is more 
than 90% over the period. The correlation for mid-caps (Next 150) is slightly lower, but still 
large: 90% between Panel C (FR, STT) and Panel D (FR, no STT) and 84% between Panel C 
and Panel E (noFRR, noSTT). Finally, co-movement with firms listed on Deutsche Boerse is 
also high with a correlation of 92% between our Panel A and the DAX index and a correlation 
of 83% between Panel C and the MDAX index. 
Our correlation results compare well to earlier studies. Umlauf (1993) analyzed the impact of 
the STT on the Swedish market, relying on the US and UK markets as control groups. The 
correlations of 9-19% are very low due to the large distance (geographical, economical, 
institutional…) of Sweden to the UK or the US in the 1980s, therefore making these stock 
markets not very suitable as control groups. Pomeranets & Weaver (2012) consider the impact 
of a STT on the NYSE by relying on Nasdaq as a control group. Although stocks listed on the 
NYSE and the Nasdaq are very different, the correlation of returns (85%) seems sufficiently 
large to allow confidence in such control group.  
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Table 2. Correlation of returns between treatment and control groups 
This table presents the coefficient of correlation of daily (portfolio) returns between treatment and control groups 
for previous studies and for our sample. For our sample, Panel A (59 French large caps) and Panel B (40 non-
French large caps) compose the Euronext 100 index. Panel C (29 French large midcaps), Panel D (49 French 
small midcaps) and Panel E (66 non-French midcaps) compose the Next 150 index. 
Study Period Treatment group Control group Correlation  
of returns 
Umlauf (1993) 1980-1987 Sweden 
MSCI UK  19.54% 
MSCI US 8.83% 
Pomeranets & 
Weaver (2012) 1971-1981 NYSE Nasdaq 85.93% 
This study Feb. 2012- Jan. 2013 
MSCI France 
MSCI Belgium 78.95% 
MSCI Netherlands 91.03% 
Euronext 100  
Panel A (FR, STT) 
Euronext 100  
Panel B (noFR, noSTT) 90.61% 
Next 150 
Panel C (FT, STT) 
Next 150 
Panel D (FR, no STT) 90.15% 
Next 150 
Panel E (noFR, no STT) 84.42% 
Euronext 100  
Panel A (FR, STT) DAX 30 92.62% 
Next 150 
Panel C (FT, STT) MDAX 50 83.42% 
 
 
3.4. Measuring market liquidity and volatility 
Unlike previous studies (summarized in Table 1) that relied on only few measures of liquidity 
or volatility, we compute a wide range of measures to account for different dimensions of 
market quality. This section describes variable construction and Table 3 reports descriptive 
statistics. 
Market liquidity. The concept of liquidity is clearly multi-dimensional.20 As stated, among 
others, by Sarr and Lybek (2002), “number of measures must be considered because there is 
no single theoretically correct and universally accepted measure to determine a market’s 
degree of liquidity”. While there is a very broad consensus on that statement, previous papers 
on the impact of financial transaction tax usually consider only a few indicators. 
                                                 
20
 Recent surveys on financial market liquidity include Gabrielsen, Marzo and Zagaglia (2011), and Vayanos and 
Wang (2012). 
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Usual measures of liquidity in the academic literature can be classified – from the less to the 
most sophisticated – in three main categories: volume-based measures, transaction cost 
measures (bid-ask spread), and price-impact measures (liquidity ratio). Accordingly, in this 
study, we use the following variables:  
• Volume, Vi,t= Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t *Pi,t where Pi,t is the 
closing price for the stock i on the day t; number of shares is expressed in thousands. 
• Bid-ask spread, Si,t = 2*100*(PAi,t–PBi,t) / (PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the 
asking price and the bid price offered for the stock i at close of market on day t, 
respectively; bid-ask spread is expressed in percentage.  
• Liquidity Ratio, LRi,t = Vi,t / | Ri,t | where Ri,t is the continuously compounded returns, 
log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1), for the stock i on the day t, respectively; liquidity ratio is expressed in 
thousands euros of trade for a price change of one percent. 
These measures gauge different aspects of market liquidity and can be considered as 
complements and not substitutes. Measuring liquidity by trading volume is the most intuitive 
way because it captures markets’ breadth and depth. However, this measure suffers from 
some drawbacks (Vayanos and Wang, 2012). First, trading activity does not provide a direct 
estimate of the costs of trading. Second, trading activity can be influenced by other variables 
than market imperfections, such as the supply of an asset, the number of investors holding it 
and the size of their trading needs. Another widely used measure of liquidity is bid-ask spread 
and it is used to assess tightness. Note that this measure provides no information on the prices 
at which larger transactions take place. By the same token, it provides no information on how 
the market might respond to a long sequence of transactions in the same direction. Market’s 
response to large buying or selling pressure is an important aspect of illiquidity.  
Liquidity denotes the ability to trade large quantities quickly, at low cost, and without moving 
the price. Several indicators of market resiliency address this definition and we choose to use 
the liquidity ratio, which assesses how much traded volume is necessary to induce a price 
change of one percent21: higher ratio is associated with higher liquidity.  
For the sake of robustness, we also consider the turnover and price reversal: 
                                                 
21
 There are several alternative to compute this ratio, which idea goes back to Dolley (1938) and Beach (1939). 
This ratio can be also expressed as the inverse of the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). Common 
alternatives is to consider the difference between the highest and the lowest daily prices instead of the return, and 
to adjust traded volume for market capitalization. However, empirical results are not qualitatively different and, 
consequently, are not reported.  
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• Turnover, Ti,t = 100*Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t / total number of 
shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors; turnover is expressed in 
percentage.  
• Price Reversal, PRi,t is minus the coefficient of a regression of Ri,t on Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1), 
controlling for Ri,t–1. 
Similar to volume, turnover captures markets’ breadth and depth, but takes into account the 
number of shares available for sale. Price reversal is a measure of price impact, like the 
liquidity ratio, albeit less intuitive. It is based on the idea that, if markets are illiquid, trades 
should generate transitory deviations between price and fundamental value22: higher price 
reversal is associated with lower liquidity.  
Market volatility. Similarly, there are several alternative measures to assess market volatility. 
According to Engle and Gallo (2006), for instance, “the concept of volatility itself is 
somewhat elusive, as many ways exist to measure it and hence to model it”. In this paper, we 
consider three different metrics: 
• Squared Return, SRi,t = (Ri,t)² where Ri,t= log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1).  
• Conditional variance, CVi,t is proxied by a GARCH(1,1) model – the model for the 
conditional mean is an AR(1) with a constant.23 
• High-low range, HLRi,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 log(2) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the 
highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively.  
Squared close-to-close return is a common estimator of the daily variance.24 Volatility 
clustering has been extensively documented, so we estimate daily conditional variance, 
proxied by a conventional GARCH(1,1) model over a period of 12 months (February 2012 – 
January 2013).25 Finally, we use a measure of price range, defined as the scaled difference 
between the highest and the lowest prices achieved on a day. The range provides volatility 
information from the entire intraday price path, without the need of high frequency data. 
                                                 
22
 The idea dates back to Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966), but was popularized by Roll (1984) who uses the 
autocovariance of daily stock returns to proxy price reversal. Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) show that 
the autocovariance of returns correlates negatively with trading volume and, then, suggest to use a conditional 
estimator. Since then, several specifications have been proposed; amongst them, the measure of Pastor 
Stambaugh (2003), which our indicator is inspired by, is one of the most used. 
23
 We have considered alternative GARCH models, but it does not change the results. 
24
 Jones and Seguin (1997) and Pomeranets and Weaver (2012) consider an unbiased estimator of the standard 
deviation computed as √(π/2)| Ri,t |. Because the first term is a constant, it does not influence the econometric 
results later on.  
25
 We consider two specifications of the mean equation: a first one with only a constant term and an AR(1). This 
choice does not have any consequence, and we report only results corresponding to the AR(1). 
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Parkinson (1980) shows that the daily high-low range is an unbiased estimator of daily 
volatility more efficient than the squared daily return. More recently, Brandt and Diebold 
(2006) find that its efficiency is comparable with that of the realized variance computed as the 
sum of squared 3-hour returns26, while it is more robust against the effects of market 
microstructure noise, particularly bid-ask bounce.27 
Additionally, for robustness purpose we use also the following measures: 
• Absolute Return, ARi,t  = |Ri,t| √π/2. 
• Daily Price Amplitude, DPAi,t = 2*100*(PHi,t–PLi,t)/(PHi,t+PLi,t) where PHi,t and PLi,t 
are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, 
respectively; price amplitude is expressed in percentage. 
Absolute return is very similar to squared return, but the mean is less impacted by extreme 
variations. We use also a different measure of condition variance by using a different 
specification for the conditional mean. Daily price amplitude is similar to High-low range, but 
its computation is somewhat more intuitive.  
Table C in appendix provides pairwise correlation coefficients for the measures of liquidity 
and volatility. Unsurprisingly, all coefficients are significantly different from zero (unless 
between daily turnover and liquidity ratio). However, they are sufficiently low to justify 
empirically the use of a wide range of measures. Among the liquidity measures, the highest 
correlation (in absolute value) is between daily volume and bid-ask spread and it is less than 
0.4. The volatility measures are more correlated with each other. Absolute and squared returns 
are obviously very correlated (0.7), as well as range and price amplitude (0.8). Range is also 
correlated with squared returns, while price amplitude is more correlated with absolute 
returns. Conditional variance is the measure the less correlated with the other measures of 
volatility. 
  
                                                 
26
 Recently, a lot of research has been devoted to the use of high-frequency data for measuring volatility and the 
so-called realized variance has rapidly gained popularity for estimating daily volatility. 
27
 We compute also the volatility for each portfolio before and after the introduction of the STT. However, 
because this indicator is not a daily metric, it can be used only for a descriptive purpose. Our final results 
(available on request) remain unchanged.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
This table provides some descriptive statistics of the stocks included in the Euronext 100 and Next 150 indexes 
(excluding 7 firms that have experienced a takeover bid or infrequent trading). The sample period extends over 
12 months: 6 months before (Feb. 2012-July. 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 
days) the introduction of the STT. All the data are daily. STT is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the 
firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. FR is a dummy variable = 1 if the stock has an ISIN code starting with 
FR; 0 otherwise. Euronext100 is a dummy variable = 1 if the stock is included in the Euronext 100 index; 0 
otherwise. Next150 is a dummy variable = 1 if the stock is included in the Next 150 index; 0 otherwise. Pi,t is the 
closing price for the stock i on the day t. MVi,t is the market value of the stock i at close of market on the day t. 
NBSTi,t is the number of shares traded for a stock i on the day t. NOSHi,t is the total number of ordinary shares for 
the stock i on day t. NOSHFFi,t is the percentage of shares available to ordinary investors for the stock i on day t. 
Volumei,t = NBSTi,t * Pi,t. Turnoveri,t = 100*NBSTi,t / (NOSHi,t * NOSHFFi,t). Bid-ask spreadi,t = 2*100*(PAi,t–
PBi,t) / (PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the asking price and the bid price offered for the stock i at close of 
market on day t, respectively. High-low range, HLRi,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 log(2) where PHi,t and PLi,t are 
the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Price amplitudei,t = 
2*100*(PHi,t–PLi,t)/(PHi,t+PLi,t). Returni,t is the continuously computed return Ri,t = 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). Squared 
Returni,t, SRi,t = (Ri,t)² with Ri,t= log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). Conditional variancei,t is estimated with a GARCH(1,1). Absolute 
Returni,t = |Ri,t| √π/2. Liquidity Ratioi,t = Vi,t / | Ri,t |; liquidity ratio is expressed in thousand euros of trades for a 
price change of 1%.  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
STT (D) 61,722 .1810 .3851 0 1 
FR (D) 61,722 .5638 .4959 0 1 
Euronext100 (D) 61,722 .4074 .4914 0 1 
Next150 (D) 61,722 .5926 .4879 0 1 
Pi,t (€) 61,596 29.28 28.14 .03 187.95 
MVi,t (thousand €) 61,596 6,795 14,482 31 112,345 
NBSTi,t (thousand) 61,578 1,771 10,187 0 778,655 
NOSHi,t (thousand) 61,596 414,746 1,084,616 2,786 1.97e+07 
NOSHFFi,t (%) 61,555 67.26 22.37 12 100 
Volumei,t (thousand €) 61,578 19,158 38,788 0 1,161,686 
Turnoveri,t (%) 61,537 .0048 .0088 0 .5128 
Bid-ask spreadi,t (%) 61,301 .3493 .7022 .0100 28.5714 
High-low rangei,t 61,578 .0004 .0014 0 .0941 
Price amplitudei,t (%) 61,578 2.6895 1.9994 0 50 
Returni,t (%) 61,594 .0348 2.2761 –44.4855 53.9536 
(Returni,t)² (%) 61,594 5.1819 28.1369 0 2,910.99 
Abs(Returni,t) (%) 61,594 1.8623 2.1614 0 67.6208 
Conditional variancei,t 61,722 5.2470 10.2932 0.0005 796.549 
Liquidity Ratioi,t (thousand €) 60,006 47,147 273,230 0 1.85e+07 
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4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Graphical representation of the parallel trends assumption 
Figures 1-2 show parallel evolution of our dependant variables for stocks included in the 
Euronext 100 and the Next 150 indexes. For Euronext 100 and Next 150, we distinguish 
between French firms that are subject to STT (FR_STT) and foreign firms that are not subject 
to STT (noFR_noSTT). For Next 150, we additionally distinguish French firms that are not 
subject to STT (FR_noSTT). The figures show that market liquidity and volatility exhibit 
parallel trends before the introduction of the STT, albeit the level is different for different 
types of firms. The observation of such parallel trends before introduction of the tax allows us 
to make a counterfactual assumption that our variables of interest would preserve these trends 
if the tax had not applied.  
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Figure 1. Dynamic of the stock market activity 
These figures present weekly un-weighted average for five different sub-samples. Euronext 100: FR STT (59 firms) + no FR, 
no STT (40 firms); Next 150: FR STT (29 firms) + FR, no STT (49 firms) + no FR, no STT (66 firms). Daily Volumei,t = 
Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t * Pi,t where Pi,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day t. Daily 
Turnoveri,t = Nb. of shares traded for the stock i on day t divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to 
ordinary investors. Bid-ask spreadi,t = 2*(PAi,t–PBi,t)/(PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the asking price and the bid price 
offered for the stock i at close of market on day t, respectively. Liquidity Ratioi,t = Vi,t / | Ri,t | with Ri,t = log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1); 
expressed in thousands euros of trades for a price change of 1%.  
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Figure 2. Dynamic of the stock market volatility  
These figures present weekly un-weighted average for five different sub-samples. Euronext 100: FR STT (59 firms) + no FR, no 
STT (40 firms); Next 150: FR STT (29 firms) + FR, no STT (49 firms) + no FR, no STT (66 firms). Absolute Returni,t = |Ri,t| 
√π/2. Conditional variancei,t is estimated with a GARCH(1,1). High-low rangei,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 log(2) where PHi,t 
and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Daily Price amplitudei,t = 
2*100*(PHi,t–PLi,t)/(PHi,t+PLi,t). 
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4.2. Difference-in-difference results 
We estimate the impact of the introduction of the STT on market quality and present results of 
difference-in-difference estimation in Tables 4-5. Estimation is done for three different 
subsamples that differ with respect to treatment and control group. In column 1, we present 
results for stocks included in the Euronext 100 index, whereas in columns 2-3 – for stocks in 
Next 150 index. The control group consists of foreign stocks in columns 1 and 3 and of 
French stocks that are not subject to the STT in column 2 (see section 3.2 for more details 
about subsamples). 
Table 4 presents results for liquidity measured by volume, turnover, bid-ask spread, liquidity 
ratio and price reversal (see section 3.3 for definitions). The results show that the introduction 
of the STT has reduced market volume and turnover of stocks subject to the STT relatively to 
control groups. The coefficients are not only statistically significant in all three subsamples 
but also economically meaningful. According to coefficients in columns 1-3, volumes have 
declined by 19%, 23% and 29% (corresponding to the coefficients of -0.2159, -0.2671 and -
0.3395).28 There is also evidence that transaction costs have gone up as the bid-ask spread has 
increased. This result holds for the subsamples in columns 1-2, but is not robust for the 
sample of large French midcaps with other foreign firms as a control group (column 3).  
This decrease in volume and the (possible) increase of bid-ask spreads should be put into their 
historical context as stock market development worldwide has been tremendous. Since 1990, 
the value of share trading at the Bourse de Paris has increased by approximately 2 000%, that 
is an increase of 50% on average per year (see Figure B - Panel A in appendix). This trend is 
similar in most of the Western countries. Moreover, the value of share trading might vary 
considerably from one year to another depending on economic situation. In 1997 and 2000, 
for instance, market volume increased by 75% compared to the previous year; in 2009 it 
decreased by almost 50% (see Figure B - Panel B in appendix). At the same time, there is a 
sharp downward trend in financial market transaction costs. Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, 
Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010) report, for instance, that the value-weighted effective 
spread in the NYSE was divided by ten between 1994 and 2005. 
  
                                                 
28
 Since transaction tax is levied on volumes, this is translated in the tax base decline of the same magnitude.  
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Table 4. The impact of the French STT on stock market liquidity  
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 
2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. 
ln(Volumei,t) = ln(Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t * Pi,t) where Pi,t is the closing price for the 
stock i on the day t; number of shares is expressed in thousands. Turnoveri,t = 100*Nb. of shares traded for the 
stock i on day t divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. Bid-ask 
spreadi,t = 2*100*(PAi,t–PBi,t)/(PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the asking price and the bid price offered for 
the stock i at close of market on day t, respectively. Liquidity Ratioi,t = Vi,t / | Ri,t | with Ri,t = 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1), 
for the stock i on the day t, respectively; liquidity ratio is expressed in thousands euros of trades for a price 
change of 1%. Price Reversali,t is minus the coefficient of a regression of Ri,t on Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1). Time and firms 
dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in 
parentheses. 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Euronext 100 Next 150 
Nb. of firms FR STT (59) 
no FR, no STT (40) 
FR STT (29) 
FR, no STT (49) 
FR STT (29) 
no FR, no STT (66) 
ln(Volumei,t)   
STT –0.2158*** –0.2671*** –0.3395*** 
(s.e.) (0.0456) (0.0834) (0.0900) 
Nb. of obs. 25,016 19,802 24,125 
adj. R2 0.897 0.827 0.835 
Turnoveri,t (%) × 100   
STT –0.1275*** –0.1460 –0.1907** 
(s.e.) (0.0245) (0.1120) (0.0791) 
Nb. of obs. 24,975 19,802 24,126 
adj. R2 0.447 0.279 0.256 
Bid-ask spreadi,t (%)   
STT 0.0232*** 0.0530** –0.0186 
(s.e.) (0.0071) (0.0254) (0.0830) 
Nb. of obs. 24,838 19,762 24,040 
adj. R2 0.272 0.497 0.540 
Liquidity ratioi,t × 1,000   
STT –1.4628 –3.7223 –5.2771** 
(s.e.) (10.5141) (2.4368) (2.4889) 
Nb. of obs. 24,800 19,118 23,351 
adj. R2 0.099 0.058 0.057 
Price reversal (dependent variable: Ri,t)  
Ri,t–1 0.0009 –0.0069 –0.0458 
(s.e.) (0.0081) (0.0151) (0.0344) 
Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1) –0.0000 –0.0000 0.0000* 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1)*STT –0.0000** 0.0000 –0.0000 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Nb. of obs. 25,012 19,802 24,126 
adj. R2 0.365 0.207 0.221 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Our finding that the introduction of the transaction tax results in the increase of transaction 
costs and a decline of trading activity is not surprising. The crucial question is whether the tax 
discouraged “rational” or “noise” traders and, thus, its impact on market resiliency. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, measures of traded volumes are imperfect measures of liquidity. 
When considering theoretically based measures, such as liquidity ratio and price reversal, 
there is no robust evidence that the STT has had a statistically significant impact. We can 
conclude that the introduction of the STT has not affected market liquidity, insofar as the 
market ability to trade large quantities without moving the price has not changed. 
Next, we look at the effect of the STT on market volatility (Table 5). Volatility is measured 
by squared returns, absolute returns, conditional variance, high-low range and price amplitude 
(see section 3.3 for variable definition). Notwithstanding the measure of volatility, we find no 
robust evidence that the introduction of the STT has affected volatility. Hence, our results 
reject the hypothesis that the introduction of the STT increases market volatility because of 
decreased traded volumes. At the same time, the alternative hypothesis that the STT drives 
away mainly “noise traders” and decreases volatility is neither supported by our data. Most 
likely, both effects are at work and the introduction of the STT has driven away both 
“rational” and “noise” traders, both effects canceling each other out. At the end, our results 
are very much in line with Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2009) who conclude that “[STT] 
reduces activity by noise and informed traders roughly equally (...), and perhaps as a result it 
does not alter bid-ask spreads or other price impact measures of liquidity, and has only a 
weak effect (if at all) on the informational efficiency of prices”.  
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Table 5. The impact of the French STT on stock market volatility 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 
2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. 
Squared Returni,t, SRi,t = (Ri,t)² with Ri,t= 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). Absolute Returni,t = |Ri,t| √π/2. Conditional 
variancei,t is estimated with a GARCH(1,1). High-low range, HLRi,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 log(2) where 
PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Price 
amplitudei,t = 2*100*(PHi,t–PLi,t)/(PHi,t+PLi,t) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price 
achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Time and firms dummies are included but not reported. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Euronext 100 Next 150 
Nb. of firms FR STT (59) 
no FR, no STT (40) 
FR STT (29) 
FR, no STT (49) 
FR STT (29) 
no FR, no STT (66) 
Squared returni,t (%)   
STT –0.1795 0.8566 –1.1502 
(s.e.) (0.3904) (1.3615) (0.9570) 
Nb. of obs. 25,018 19,812 24,130 
adj. R2 0.165 0.034 0.063 
Absolute returni,t (%)   
STT –0.0341 –0.0450 –0.0994 
(s.e.) (0.0767) (0.1182) (0.0954) 
Nb. of obs. 25,018 19,812 24,130 
adj. R2 0.296 0.168 0.190 
Conditional variancei,t  
STT 0.0341 0.0141 –0.4725 
(s.e.) (0.4568) (1.0874) (0.8709) 
Nb. of obs. 25,146 19,812 24,130 
adj. R2 0.589 0.281 0.362 
High-low rangei,t   
STT 0.0000 0.0001 –0.0001 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Nb. of obs. 25,016 19,802 24,126 
adj. R2 0.276 0.111 0.161 
Price amplitudei,t (%)   
STT 0.0091 –0.0130 –0.1304 
(s.e.) (0.1006) (0.1329) (0.1445) 
Nb. of obs. 25,016 19,802 24,126 
adj. R2 0.441 0.329 0.348 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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5. Robustness checks 
5.1. Robustness sample 
First, for robustness checks, we applied more stringent filters in order to preclude any outliers 
that might bias the results. Precisely, we exclude companies for which stock price was lower 
than €2 at least one day over the period or the total volume over the period below k€60,000. 
This robustness sample contains 82% of the initial one. Results are reported in Tables D-E of 
the appendix and they are very similar with Tables 4-5.  
 
5.2. Impact over time 
To analyze the impact of the STT, we have chosen a window of 12 month around the tax 
introduction, mainly due to the recent nature of the tax that was introduced in August 2012. 
To test, whether our results are sensitive to the choice of window length and whether we need 
to consider a longer period after the introduction of the tax, we estimate the effect of the tax 
separately for every month after the tax introduction. The results, presented in Tables F, 
indicate that our earlier findings that the STT has a negative effect on market volume and 
turnover, but positive effect on bid-ask spread are manifested from the first month, are not 
driven by one month and are rather stable over time. Interestingly, we find that in two 
subsamples there are strong negative effects on liquidity ratio but they disappear after four 
months. As before, we find no effect on volatility: almost all coefficients are not statistically 
significant and when some isolated coefficients appear significant they have conflicting signs. 
 
5.3. DAX and MDAX as control groups 
One may argue that the STT might have a global impact on all Euronext stocks due to co-
movement in liquidity that result, inter alia, from the fact that modern investors often buy all 
stocks in the same index. Cespa and Foucault (2011) have shown that liquidity spillover can 
be positive or negative depending on the cost of price information. In either case, our estimate 
of the impact could be biased if we consider other securities from Euronext as a control group. 
Therefore, we test robustness of our results by relying on a control group consisting of 
German stocks traded on Deutsche Boerse (Xetra) and included in the DAX 30 and the 
MDAX 50 indexes. This sample is less likely to be impacted by potential co-movement in 
liquidity, but at the same time it is tightly correlated with Euronext stocks to justify its use as 
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a control group (see Table 2). 
Results of difference-in-difference estimation are presented in Tables G-H. In column 1, the 
sample consists of largest French stocks in Euronext 100 (treated group) and largest German 
stocks in DAX (control group). In column 2, the sample covers mid-cap French stocks in Next 
150 (treated group) and mid-cap German stocks in MDAX (control group). Both samples 
confirm our earlier findings. The introduction of the STT always has a negative effect on 
market volume and there is also evidence that it might increase the bid-ask spread. At the 
same time, the effect on liquidity ratio is insignificant, meaning that markets are sufficiently 
liquid to be able to absorb large market transactions without any price effects. Finally, there is 
no effect on volatility.   
 
5.4. Propensity score matching 
To further improve the quality of the control group, we rely on propensity score matching. 
This will allow us to compare stocks that were subjected to a STT with comparable (foreign 
and French) stocks listed on Euronext that were not subjected to a tax. In order to determine 
“comparable” stocks we compute average market capitalization and turnover of stocks 
included in Euronex 100 and Next 150 before the introduction of the STT and then run a 
logistic regression, where a probability of a stock being subjected to a tax is a function of 
these observable characteristics (market capitalization, turnover and volatility). The choice of 
the first two variables follows Foucault et al. (2011) and we augment the model with an 
additional volatility measure (squared returns, conditional variance, high-low range). We 
assure that all variables in the model are statistically significant, because we rely on model 
coefficients to assign to each stock a probability of being taxed and then match stocks 
subjected to the STT with stocks that were the “closest” in terms of the propensity score. We 
test robustness of our results with “the nearest neighbor” and “Kernel” matching. In the 
second step, we compare the performance of the taxed stocks with the matched stocks that 
were not subjected to STT by estimating the following econometric model: 
 − 

=  + 	 + 
	 +  + . 
Estimation results, presented in Tables 6-7, confirm our earlier findings that the introduction 
of the STT always has a negative effect on market volume, but no effect on market liquidity 
or volatility. Similar to our earlier findings, a negative effect on market turnover and a 
positive effect on bid-ask spread is not always robust.  
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Table 6. The impact of the French STT on stock market liquidity  
(propensity score matching) 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests, where we rely on propensity score matching to 
match firms that were subject to the tax with firms in the control group that had the closest propensity to be 
subjected to the tax. Matching is performed on market capitalization and turnover. Models are estimated on 6 
months before (Feb. 2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the 
introduction of the STT. STT is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 
otherwise. ln(Volumei,t) = ln(Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t * Pi,t) where Pi,t is the closing price 
for the stock i on the day t; number of shares is expressed in thousands. Turnoveri,t = 100*Nb. of shares traded 
for the stock i on day t divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. 
Bid-ask spreadi,t = 2*100*(PAi,t–PBi,t)/(PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the asking price and the bid price 
offered for the stock i at close of market on day t, respectively. Liquidity Ratioi,t = Vi,t / | Ri,t | with Ri,t = 
100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1), for the stock i on the day t, respectively; liquidity ratio is expressed in thousands euros of 
trades for a price change of 1%. Time and firms dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. 
 Nearest neighbor 
matching 
Kernel matching 
ln(Volumei,t)   
STT –0.167*** –0.216*** 
(s.e.) (0.053) 0.033 
Nb. of obs. 21,970 61,557 
adj. R2 0.012 0.210 
Turnoveri,t (%) × 100 
STT 0.028 –0.138*** 
(s.e.) (0.07) 0.013 
Nb. of obs. 21,847 61,537 
adj. R2 0.000 0.009 
Bid-ask spreadi,t (%) 
STT –0.078 0.022* 
(s.e.) (0.060) 0.011 
Nb. of obs. 21,774 60,006 
adj. R2 0.004 0.014 
Liquidity ratioi,t × 1,000 
STT –6.482 8.050 
(s.e.) (0.631) 4.160 
Nb. of obs. 20,992 60,006 
adj. R2 0.000 0.014 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
  
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.85
29 
Table 7. The impact of the French STT on stock market volatility  
(propensity score matching) 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests, where we rely on propensity score matching to 
match firms that were subject to the tax with firms in the control group that had the closest propensity to be 
subjected to the tax. Matching is performed on market capitalization and turnover. Models are estimated on 6 
months before (Feb. 2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the 
introduction of the STT. STT is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 
otherwise. Squared Returni,t, SRi,t = (Ri,t)² with Ri,t= 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). Absolute Returni,t = |Ri,t| √π/2. 
Conditional variancei,t is estimated with a GARCH(1,1). High-low range, HLRi,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 
log(2) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, 
respectively. Price amplitudei,t = 2*100*(PHi,t–PLi,t)/(PHi,t+PLi,t) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and 
the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Firm dummies are included but not reported. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. 
 Nearest neighbor  
matching 
Kernel matching 
Squared returni,t (%)   
STT 0.222 –0.087 
(s.e.) (1.066) 0.445 
Nb. of obs. 21,968 61,594 
adj. R2 0.000 0.002 
Absolute returni,t (%) 
STT 0.009 –0.027 
(s.e.) (0.088) 0.037 
Nb. of obs. 21,968 61,594 
adj. R2 0.000 0.017 
Conditional variancei,t 
STT 0.373 –0.107 
(s.e.) (0.979) 0.162 
Nb. of obs. 22,352 61,722 
adj. R2 0.000 0.008 
High-low rangei,t 
STT –0.000 –0.000 
(s.e.) (0.0001) 0.000 
Nb. of obs. 21,970 61,578 
adj. R2 0.000 0.005 
Price amplitudei,t (%) 
STT 0.019 –0.017 
(s.e.) (0.125) 0.033 
Nb. of obs. 21,970 61,578 
adj. R2 0.000 0.034 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the impact of financial transaction taxes on market volatility. This 
question is at the heart of economic policy debate about the use of financial transaction taxes 
to curb speculative activity and render financial markets more stable. In contrast, the 
opponents argue that taxation of financial transactions will hurt market liquidity, thus, making 
markets even more volatile.  
Since theoretical predictions on this subject are ambiguous, there is a need for an econometric 
analysis. Although a number of papers empirically examine the impact of STT, there is no 
paper that can make a strong case for a causal relationship between STT and volatility. Most 
of these studies do not address endogeneity problems inasmuch as they cannot isolate the 
impact of the STT from other economic developments during the same time period.  
In this paper, we study the impact of the STT introduction in France in 2012 on market 
liquidity and volatility. Unlike previous studies, we are able to isolate the effect of the tax due 
to the unique design of the French STT. As the tax is levied only on large French firms traded 
on Euronext, this provides us with two control groups (smaller French firms and foreign 
firms) and allows us to use difference-in-difference methodology. Our results show that the 
introduction of the STT has reduced volume and turnover of stocks and increased bid-ask 
spreads. At the same time, we find no effect on theoretically based measures of liquidity, such 
as price impact. As to volatility measures, the results are mostly insignificant. Our results are 
robust to a number of robustness tests that include different control groups, dynamic effects 
and propensity score matching. 
To sum up, our investigation shows that STT is neither a panacea nor a “madness” for 
financial markets. Our results do not confirm expectations that STT decreases market 
volatility by curbing speculative activity, but at the same time, there is no significant effect on 
market volatility and even liquidity.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A. Average free float and market capitalization of the initial panels 
 
Stocks subject to the STT Stocks not subject to the STT 
 
Free Float  
(%) 
Market Value 
(bil. €) 
Free Float  
(%) 
Market Value 
(bil. €) 
Free Float  
(%) 
Market Value 
(bil. €) 
Euronext 100 Panel A (FR, STT), # 59 Panel B (noFR, no STT)b), # 41   
Mean 69 17,256 71 14,642   
Min 16 3,186 22 2,902   
Max 100 94,688 100 109,345   
SD 23 20,128 24 22,179   
Next 150 Panel C (FR, STT)c), # 30 Panel D (FR, no STT), # 49 Panel E (noFR, no STT)d), # 71 
Mean 61 2,118 62 459 70 848 
Min 24 996 24 96 15 113 
Max 100 4,025 100 1 756 100 3,536 
SD 21 828 20 382 22 695 
Stocks not included in the indexes a), # 20 
Mean 18 5,366 
 
Min 1 1,025 
Max 39 24,862 
SD 13 6,740 
Source: Datastream (December 11, 2012). Authors’ computation. Note: a) Altarea, Areva, Bollore, Cambodge (Cie), 
Christian Dior, CIC, Ciments français, CNP assurances, Colas, Dassault aviation, Euler Hermes, Financière de 
l’Odet, Foncière Développement Logements, Foncière lyonnaise, Fromageries Bel, Hermes international, Autoroute 
Paris-Rhin-Rhone, Somfy, Vicat, Vilmorin et Cie. b) TNT Express, which experienced a takeover bid in 2012, is 
removed in the final sample. c) CFAO, which experienced a takeover bid in 2012, is removed in the final sample. d) 
Degven, Dockwise, Mediq, and LBI International which experienced a takeover bid in 2012, is removed in the final 
sample. Espirito Santo Finl.GP. is also removed in the final sample due to infrequent trading. 
 
Table B. Number of observations  
This table provides the number of observations (nb firms × nb days) for each sample and the percentage of the 
initial sample. The sample period extends over 12 months: 6 months before (Feb. 2012-July. 2012, 127 days) and 
6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. The initial sample includes all 
stocks included in the Euronext 100 and Next 150 indexes. The final sample excludes all companies that 
experienced a takeover bid over the period (#6) or securities infrequently traded (#1). The robustness sample 
excludes companies for which we lack observations at the beginning of the period (#2) and all observations that 
meet the following criteria: stock price below €2 at least one day over the period or total volume over the period 
below k€60,000. 
Panel Initial  
sample 
Final  
sample 
Robustness  
sample 
Euronext 100    
FR, STT 14,986 14,986 (100%) 14,724   (98%) 
noFR, noSTT 10,414 10,160   (98%) 9,386   (90%) 
Next 150    
FR, STT 7,620 7,366   (97%) 7,105   (93%) 
FR, noSTT 12,446 12,446 (100%) 9,070   (73%) 
noFR, noSTT 18,034 16,764   (93%) 11,643   (65%) 
Total 63,500 61,722   (97%) 51,928   (82%) 
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Table C. Correlation Matrix  
This table provides pairwise correlation coefficients for the liquidity measures and the volatility measures. The 
sample period extends over 12 months: 6 months before (Feb. 2012-July. 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after 
(Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. ln(Volumei,t) = ln(Number of shares traded for the 
stock i on day t * Pi,t) where Pi,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day t. Turnoveri,t = Nb. of shares traded 
for the stock i on day t divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. 
Bid-ask spreadi,t = 2*(PAi,t–PBi,t)/(PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the asking price and the bid price offered 
for the stock i at close of market on day t, respectively. Liquidity Ratioi,t = Vi,t / | Ri,t | with Ri,t = log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). 
Squared Returni,t, SRi,t = (Ri,t)² with Ri,t= 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). Absolute Returni,t = |Ri,t| √π/2. Conditional 
variancei,t is estimated with a GARCH(1,1). High-low range, HLRi,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 log(2) where 
PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Price 
amplitudei,t = 2*100*(PHi,t–PLi,t)/(PHi,t+PLi,t) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price 
achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. 
Liquidity measures 
 ln(Volumei,t) Turnoveri,t Bid-ask spreadi,t Liquidity Ratioi,t  
ln(Volumei,t)   1.0000     
Turnoveri,t   0.2573*   1.0000    
Bid-ask spreadi,t –0.3989* –0.0262*   1.0000   
Liquidity Ratioi,t   0.2164*   0.0030 –0.0717*   1.0000  
Volatility measures 
 Abs. Returni,t Sq. Returni,t GARCHi,t HLRi,t Price amplitudei,t 
Abs. Returni,t   1.0000     
Sq. Returni,t   0.7175*   1.0000    
GARCHi,t   0.3059*   0.2579*   1.0000   
HLRi,t   0.5846*   0.6828*   0.4979*   1.0000  
Price amplitudei,t   0.7391*   0.5372*   0.5190*   0.7866*   1.0000 
*
 indicates a correlation statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
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Table D. The impact of the French STT on stock market liquidity (Robustness sample) 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 
2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. STT 
is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. ln(Volumei,t) = 
ln(Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t * Pi,t) where Pi,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day 
t; number of shares is expressed in thousands. Turnoveri,t = 100*Nb. of shares traded for the stock i on day t 
divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. Bid-ask spreadi,t = 
2*100*(PAi,t–PBi,t)/(PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the asking price and the bid price offered for the stock i 
at close of market on day t, respectively. Liquidity Ratioi,t = Vi,t / | Ri,t | with Ri,t = 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1), for the 
stock i on the day t, respectively; liquidity ratio is expressed in thousands euros of trades for a price change of 
1%. Price Reversali,t is minus the coefficient of a regression of Ri,t on Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1). Time and firms dummies 
are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in 
parentheses. We exclude companies for which we lack observations at the beginning of the period (#2) and all 
observations that meet the following criteria: stock price below €2 at least one day over the period or total 
volume over the period below k€60,000.  
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Euronext 100 Next 150 
Nb. of firms FR STT (59) 
no FR, no STT (40) 
FR STT (29) 
FR, no STT (49) 
FR STT (29) 
no FR, no STT (66) 
ln(Volumei,t)   
STT –0.2037*** –0.3479*** –0.2908*** 
(s.e.) (0.0409) (0.0867) (0.0814) 
Nb. of obs. 24,106 16,166 18,748 
adj. R2 0.907 0.818 0.838 
Turnoveri,t (%) × 100   
STT –0.1144*** –0.2346*** –0.1948** 
(s.e.) (0.0237) (0.0875) (0.0780) 
Nb. of obs. 24,106 16,166 18,748 
adj. R2 0.503 0.335 0.532 
Bid-ask spreadi,t (%)   
STT 0.0163*** 0.0542* 0.0317* 
(s.e.) (0.0051) (0.0288) (0.0186) 
Nb. of obs. 23,930 16,130 18,681 
adj. R2 0.281 0.375 0.415 
Liquidity ratioi,t × 1,000   
STT –1.8140 –3.5594 –5.4367** 
(s.e.) (10.8028) (2.5064) (2.6067) 
Nb. of obs. 23,907 15,758 18,394 
adj. R2 0.098 0.053 0.052 
Price reversal (dependent variable: Ri,t)  
Ri,t–1 –0.0003 –0.0211** –0.0164 
(s.e.) (0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0112) 
Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1) –0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1)*STT –0.0000 0.0000 –0.0000 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Nb. of obs. 24,106 16,166 19,009 
adj. R2 0.385 0.287 0.307 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.85
37 
Table E. The impact of the French STT on stock market volatility (Robustness sample) 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 
2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. STT 
is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. Squared Returni,t, 
SRi,t = (Ri,t)² with Ri,t= 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). Absolute Returni,t = |Ri,t| √π/2. Conditional variancei,t is estimated with 
a GARCH(1,1). High-low range, HLRi,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 log(2) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest 
price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Price amplitudei,t = 2*100*(PHi,t–
PLi,t)/(PHi,t+PLi,t) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the 
day t, respectively. Time and firms dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. We exclude companies for which we lack observations at the 
beginning of the period (#2) and all observations that meet the following criteria: stock price below €2 at least 
one day over the period or total volume over the period below k€60,000. 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Euronext 100 Next 150 
Nb. of firms FR STT (59) 
no FR, no STT (40) 
FR STT (29) 
FR, no STT (49) 
FR STT (29) 
no FR, no STT (66) 
Squared returni,t (%)   
STT –0.1105 –0.3972 –0.2016 
(s.e.) (0.3805) (0.4325) (0.3700) 
Nb. of obs. 24,110 16,175 18,748 
adj. R2 0.248 0.162 0.177 
Absolute returni,t (%)   
STT –0.0304 –0.1346 –0.0262 
(s.e.) (0.0790) (0.0890) (0.0839) 
Nb. of obs. 24,110 16,175 18,748 
adj. R2 0.312 0.215 0.247 
Conditional variancei,t  
STT 0.1272 –1.2108** 0.2846 
(s.e.) (0.4842) (0.4962) (0.5397) 
Nb. of obs. 24,110 16,175 18,748 
adj. R2 0.592 0.232 0.326 
High-low rangei,t   
STT –0.0000 –0.0000 0.0000 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Nb. of obs. 24,106 16,166 18,748 
adj. R2 0.300 0.200 0.215 
Price amplitudei,t (%)   
STT –0.0070 –0.0948 –0.0198 
(s.e.) (0.1018) (0.1066) (0.0999) 
Nb. of obs. 24,106 16,166 18,748 
adj. R2 0.449 0.365 0.373 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table F. The impact of the French STT over 6 months 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 
2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. STT 
is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. ln(Volumei,t) = 
ln(Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t * Pi,t) where Pi,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day 
t; number of shares is expressed in thousands. Turnoveri,t = 100*Nb. of shares traded for the stock i on day t 
divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. Bid-ask spreadi,t = 
2*100*(PAi,t–PBi,t)/(PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the asking price and the bid price offered for the stock i 
at close of market on day t, respectively.   
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Euronext 100 Next 150 
Nb. of firms FR STT (59) 
no FR, no STT (40) 
FR STT (29) 
FR, no STT (49) 
FR STT (29) 
no FR, no STT (66) 
ln(Volumei,t)   
STT × August 2012 –0.3138*** –0.2602*** –0.3632*** 
(s.e.) (0.0550) (0.0812) (0.0689) 
STT × September 2012 –0.1799*** –0.1608 –0.2766*** 
(s.e.) (0.0496) (0.1043) (0.0938) 
STT × October 2012 –0.1372** –0.2085* –0.3457*** 
(s.e.) (0.0547) (0.1110) (0.1194) 
STT × November 2012 –0.1691*** –0.2527** –0.3181*** 
(s.e.) (0.0578) (0.1198) (0.1120) 
STT × December 2012 –0.2412*** –0.3417*** –0.2950*** 
(s.e.) (0.0602) (0.1072) (0.1099) 
STT × January 2013 –0.2550*** –0.3891*** –0.4211*** 
(s.e.) (0.0620) (0.1009) (0.1263) 
Nb. of obs. 25,016 19,802 24,125 
adj. R2 0.897 0.827 0.835 
Turnoveri,t (%) × 100   
STT × August 2012 –0.1339*** –0.2093 –0.2260** 
(s.e.) (0.0254) (0.1264) (0.0880) 
STT × September 2012 –0.1041*** –0.0019 –0.1375** 
(s.e.) (0.0299) (0.1249) (0.0682) 
STT × October 2012 –0.0964*** –0.0935 –0.1483 
(s.e.) (0.0293) (0.1515) (0.0933) 
STT × November 2012 –0.1264*** –0.1998 –0.1432 
(s.e.) (0.0374) (0.1659) (0.0998) 
STT × December 2012 –0.1601*** –0.1368 –0.2257** 
(s.e.) (0.0405) (0.1288) (0.0995) 
STT × January 2013 –0.1502*** –0.2190** –0.2670*** 
(s.e.) (0.0344) (0.0860) (0.0931) 
Nb. of obs. 24,975 19,802 24,126 
adj. R2 0.448 0.279 0.256 
Bid-ask spreadi,t (%)    
STT × August 2012 0.0183*** 0.0360 –0.0063 
(s.e.) (0.0068) (0.0368) (0.0267) 
STT × September 2012 0.0201*** 0.0211 0.0216 
(s.e.) (0.0068) (0.0294) (0.0335) 
STT × October 2012 0.0294*** 0.0509* 0.0666* 
(s.e.) (0.0094) (0.0302) (0.0376) 
STT × November 2012 0.0157* 0.0101 –0.0241 
(s.e.) (0.0086) (0.0337) (0.0660) 
STT × December 2012 0.0246*** 0.0969*** –0.0168 
(s.e.) (0.0093) (0.0268) (0.1224) 
STT × January 2013 0.0314*** 0.1107*** –0.1532 
(s.e.) (0.0102) (0.0311) (0.2742) 
Nb. of obs. 24,838 19,762 24,040 
adj. R2 0.272 0.498 0.540 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table F. The impact of the French STT over 6 months (continued) 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 
2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. STT 
is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. Liquidity Ratioi,t = 
Vi,t / | Ri,t | with Ri,t = 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1), for the stock i on the day t, respectively; liquidity ratio is expressed in 
thousands euros of trades for a price change of 1%. Squared Returni,t, SRi,t = (Ri,t)² with Ri,t= 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). 
Absolute Returni,t = |Ri,t| √π/2.   
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Euronext 100 Next 150 
Nb. of firms FR STT (59) 
no FR, no STT (40) 
FR STT (29) 
FR, no STT (49) 
FR STT (29) 
no FR, no STT (66) 
Liquidity Ratioi,t × 1,000   
STT × August 2012 1.7395 –9.3796*** –9.6862*** 
(s.e.) (11.8820) (2.8844) (3.0003) 
STT × September 2012 13.4854 –6.1486** –7.2443*** 
(s.e.) (20.3060) (2.5593) (2.6489) 
STT × October 2012 –35.3316** –2.9625 –4.1000 
(s.e.) (16.9529) (3.1749) (3.2777) 
STT × November 2012 2.9558 –4.6392*** –5.0050*** 
(s.e.) (16.8945) (1.6051) (1.8079) 
STT × December 2012 24.8907 0.9695 –3.2557 
(s.e.) (20.5469) (3.9938) (4.2277) 
STT × January 2013 –7.8184 0.8194 –1.9540 
(s.e.) (22.5805) (3.6792) (3.7642) 
Nb. of obs. 24,800 19,118 23,351 
adj. R2 0.099 0.059 0.057 
Squared Returni,t (%)   
STT × August 2012 0.2459 0.0649 –0.4466 
(s.e.) (0.3456) (1.9181) (0.7240) 
STT × September 2012 0.0923 2.6262* –0.0226 
(s.e.) (0.4282) (1.4974) (1.0709) 
STT × October 2012 –0.0094 0.6105 0.1292 
(s.e.) (0.4298) (1.6609) (0.8151) 
STT × November 2012 –0.5121 –0.6549 –0.0589 
(s.e.) (0.5384) (2.2769) (1.0855) 
STT × December 2012 –0.7063 1.4453 –1.9732 
(s.e.) (0.7058) (1.6857) (2.1452) 
STT × January 2013 –0.3093 1.3892 –4.7039 
(s.e.) (0.5336) (1.3548) (3.6550) 
Nb. of obs. 25,018 19,812 24,130 
adj. R2 0.165 0.034 0.063 
Absolute Returni,t (%)    
STT × August 2012 –0.0208 –0.1123 –0.2153** 
(s.e.) (0.0742) (0.1504) (0.0978) 
STT × September 2012 0.0852 0.2711* 0.0583 
(s.e.) (0.0795) (0.1543) (0.1391) 
STT × October 2012 0.0453 –0.0556 –0.0284 
(s.e.) (0.0882) (0.1682) (0.1282) 
STT × November 2012 –0.0948 –0.1092 –0.0037 
(s.e.) (0.1028) (0.1866) (0.1357) 
STT × December 2012 –0.1710 –0.1468 –0.1695 
(s.e.) (0.1250) (0.1966) (0.1799) 
STT × January 2013 –0.0733 –0.1081 –0.2377 
(s.e.) (0.1150) (0.1538) (0.2072) 
Nb. of obs. 25,018 19,812 24,130 
adj. R2 0.296 0.168 0.190 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table G. The impact of the French STT on stock market liquidity,  
Control group: DAX and MDAX 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 
2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. STT 
is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. ln(Volumei,t) = 
ln(Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t * Pi,t) where Pi,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day 
t; number of shares is expressed in thousands. Turnoveri,t = 100*Nb. of shares traded for the stock i on day t 
divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. Bid-ask spreadi,t = 
2*100*(PAi,t–PBi,t)/(PAi,t+PBi,t) where PAi,t and PBi,t are the asking price and the bid price offered for the stock i 
at close of market on day t, respectively. Liquidity Ratioi,t = Vi,t / | Ri,t | with Ri,t = 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1), for the 
stock i on the day t, respectively; liquidity ratio is expressed in thousands euros of trades for a price change of 
1%. Price Reversali,t is minus the coefficient of a regression of Ri,t on Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1). Time and firms dummies 
are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in 
parentheses. 
Model (1) (2) 
Sample Euronext 100 & DAX Next 150 & MDAX 
Nb. of firms FR STT (59) 
DAX (30) 
FR STT (29) 
MDAX (49) 
ln(Volumei,t)  
STT –0.1406*** –0.2538*** 
(s.e.) (0.0328) (0.0843) 
Nb. of obs. 22606 19641 
adj. R2 0.925 0.765 
Turnoveri,t (%) × 100  
STT –0.0631*** –0.0961 
(s.e.) (0.0208) (0.0785) 
Nb. of obs. 22606 19635 
adj. R2 0.533 0.437 
Bid-ask spreadi,t (%)  
STT 0.0331*** 0.0390*** 
(s.e.) (0.0034) (0.0134) 
Nb. of obs. 22491 19613 
adj. R2 0.329 0.284 
Liquidity ratioi,t × 1,000  
STT –4.6205 –2.7125 
(s.e.) (13.8093) (2.8530) 
Nb. of obs. 22452 19399 
adj. R2 0.104 0.054 
Price reversal (dependent variable: Ri,t) 
Ri,t–1 –0.0047 0.0032 
(s.e.) (0.0091) (0.0123) 
Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1) –0.0000 –0.0000 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Vi,t–1*sign(Ri,t–1)*STT –0.0000*** 0.0000 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Nb. of obs. 22606 19640 
adj. R2 0.425 0.326 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table H. The impact of the French STT on stock market volatility,  
Control group: DAX and MDAX 
This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 
2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. STT 
is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. Squared Returni,t, 
SRi,t = (Ri,t)² with Ri,t= 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). Absolute Returni,t = |Ri,t| √π/2. Conditional variancei,t is estimated with 
a GARCH(1,1). High-low range, HLRi,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 log(2) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest 
price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Price amplitudei,t = 2*100*(PHi,t–
PLi,t)/(PHi,t+PLi,t) where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the 
day t, respectively. Time and firms dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. 
Model (1) (2) 
Sample Euronext 100 & DAX Next 150 & MDAX 
Nb. of firms FR STT (59) 
DAX (30) 
FR STT (29) 
MDAX (49) 
Squared returni,t (%)  
STT –0.3259 –0.5056 
(s.e.) (0.2873) (0.4113) 
Nb. of obs. 22,606 19,641 
adj. R2 0.198 0.058 
Absolute returni,t (%)  
STT –0.0185 –0.1057 
(s.e.) (0.0664) (0.0742) 
Nb. of obs. 22,606 19,641 
adj. R2 0.334 0.226 
Conditional variancei,t  
STT 0.0987 0.1184 
(s.e.) (0.4591) (0.4754) 
Nb. of obs. 22,606 19,641 
adj. R2 0.492 0.214 
High-low rangei,t  
STT 0.0000 –0.0000 
(s.e.) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Nb. of obs. 22,606 19,641 
adj. R2 0.335 0.189 
Price amplitudei,t (%) 
STT 0.0012 –0.1302 
(s.e.) (0.0725) (0.0916) 
Nb. of obs. 22,606 19,641 
adj. R2 0.478 0.361 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table I. Results of the Probit models for the propensity score matching 
This table presents Probit models that allow us to compute propensity scores to match firms that were subject to the tax 
with firms in the control group that had the closest propensity to be subjected to the tax. Models are estimated on the 
data averaged for 6 months before the introduction of the tax (Feb. 2012-July 2012, 127 days). Market capitalization = 
Total number of shares for the stock i on day t * Pi,t where Pi,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day t. Turnoveri,t 
= 100*Nb. of shares traded for the stock i on day t divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to 
ordinary investors. Squared Returni,t, SRi,t = (Ri,t)² with Ri,t= 100*log(Pi,t / Pi,t–1). Absolute Returni,t = |Ri,t| √π/2. 
Conditional variancei,t is estimated with a GARCH(1,1). High-low range, HLRi,t = (log PHi,t – log PLi,t)² / 4 log(2) 
where PHi,t and PLi,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Market capitalizationi 
0.00001*** 
(2.83) 
0.00001*** 
(2.79) 
0.00001*** 
(2.61) 
Turnoveri 
109.58*** 
(4.26) 
118.69*** 
(4.43) 
119.13*** 
(26.22) 
Squared returni  
–0.13*** 
(-3.78) 
Conditional variancei 
–0.14*** 
(-3.88) 
High-low rangei 
–2021.76*** 
(465.07) 
Constant 
–0.37** 
(-2.29) 
–0.39** 
(-2.44) 
–0.28* 
(0.16) 
Nb. of obs. 249 249 249 
Pseudo R² 0.1206 0.1318 0.1426 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 indicates a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure A. Revenues from the French FTT 
 
Source: OECD. 1970-2007: “Impôt de Bourse”; 2012-2013 (expected): “Taxe sur les transactions financières”  
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Figure B. Historical trading volume at the “Bourse de Paris” 
Panel A. Annual turnover 
 
Panel B. Annual variation 
 
Source : Euronext. 
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